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Assisting Rebels Abroad: The Ethics of Violence at the Limits
of the Defensive Paradigm
CHRISTOPHER J. FINLAY
ABSTRACT In this article, I analyse the theory and practice of interventions in foreign civil
wars to assist rebels fighting against violently oppressive government. I argue that the indirect
nature of this kind of intervention gives rise to political complications that are either absent
from or less obvious in humanitarian interventions aimed chiefly at defending human rights
from imminent threats. An adequate theory must therefore accommodate three additional com-
ponents. First, it requires a theory of indirect warfare accounting for how the ends of the inter-
veners’ added violence relate to those of the rebels’ violence. Second, it requires a theory of
indirect political leadership, paying careful attention both to the political status of the rebel
leaders vis-a-vis the people on whose behalf they fight and to the relationship between those
leaders and the interveners. Third, the peculiarities of indirect military intervention mean that
the violence it introduces isn’t easily explained purely in terms of defensive goals. An adequate
account needs additionally to pay attention to the role of violence in shaping new political
movements and institutions. The value of such goals is less easily quantified than those of
humanitarian intervention, making it harder to set upper limits on permissible ‘proportionate’
harm.
The question of whether foreign states might permissibly assist rebels has been widely
debated for at least three centuries. The most influential account is Mill’s ‘A Few
Words on Non-Intervention’ (1859), which argued against assisting purely domestic
rebellions.1 But the issue had been treated before. Vattel’s Law of Nations (1758)
argued that ‘every foreign power has a right to succour an oppressed people who
implore their assistance’. In fully fledged civil wars, ‘foreign powers may assist that
party which appears to them to have justice on its side’.2 The question arose again for
western powers after the French Revolution.3 During the twentieth century, Russian
Red Army leaders debated how best to support revolutions abroad in what Lenin
regarded as a global civil war against supporters of the anticommunist White Army.4
And Cold-War western interference abroad prompted Michael Walzer’s return to Mill
in response to US involvement in Vietnam’s civil war.5 The Syrian conflict recently
revived the question, particularly among liberal-democratic philosophers.6
By contrast with overthrowing a government by direct military intervention (hence-
forth, ’reform intervention,’ e.g. in Iraq, 2003) and, indeed, with humanitarian inter-
ventions against genocide or crimes against humanity, assisting rebels is a form of
indirect military intervention. My overarching claim is that its indirect nature gives rise
to political complications that are either absent from or less obvious in cases of direct
intervention. Rather than pursuing ends chiefly by the intervener’s own action, indirect
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philoso-
phy, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Journal of Applied Philosophy
doi: 10.1111/japp.12456
interveners bring about change by acting on and through other political agents, the
rebels. Indirect intervention therefore requires careful attention to the ethical compli-
cations arising from questions of legitimate political leadership. Secondly, both reform
and humanitarian interventions employ violence chiefly to eliminate or deter threats,
thus opening safe spaces within which the positive tasks of political reconstruction can
be pursued nonviolently. By contrast, I argue that indirect military intervention, prop-
erly understood, gives violence a more creative role in generating and shaping political
possibilities. The multiple functions that violence serves in indirect military interven-
tion put a strain on an ethical theory modelled on actions that are defensive in a more
restrictive sense.
I begin in the next section (Part 2) by questioning the ‘parallelism’ of recent philo-
sophical treatments of intervention and rebellion and propose a different starting point
for analysis. I then identify three distinctive components that a theory of indirect mili-
tary intervention needs. First (Part 3), it must address how the ends of the interveners’
added violence relate to those of rebel violence. Second (Part 4), a theory of indirect
political agency pays careful attention to the relationships of rebel leaders to the rebel
people and of the interveners to the rebel leaders. Both of these issues complicate the
theory by comparison with theories of both humanitarian intervention and revolution.
Third (Part 5), I argue that the peculiarities of indirect military intervention mean that
the violence it introduces isn’t easily explained purely in defensive terms. Moreover,
the value of its goals – like those of revolution – is less easily quantified than those of
humanitarian intervention. It is therefore harder to set clear upper limits on permissi-
ble collateral harm with reference to proportionality in cases of indirect military inter-
vention compared with humanitarian intervention.
Before I begin, some stipulations and clarifications: First, the word ‘rebels’ refers
here to armed, nonstate actors aiming at revolutionary change with potential to secure
self-determination through a human-rights-respecting democracy (‘democracy,’ for
short). Second, I presume that this purpose can sometimes justify armed rebellion.7
Third, my claims concern any attempts to assist rebels militarily, including active par-
ticipation (e.g. air support); supplying military experts; and training, arming, and
funding rebels.8 While each raises distinctive issues, all share enough features to
require a unified theoretical framework. Once we have one, then we might give the
differences more fine-grained attention (a problem for another day).
Humanitarian Intervention and Rebellion: From Parallelism to
Complementarity
According to the ‘prevailing’ liberal view, Ned Dobos writes, the set of cases where a
state’s domestic actions justify armed, international intervention and that in which its
own citizens can justify rebellion may overlap extensively but are not quite the same:
‘armed intervention is not always justified even where rebellion with similar aims,
employing similar means, is acknowledged to be a legitimate option for the victims of
tyranny’.9 Defenders of this asymmetry variously cite differences in how ad bellum pro-
portionality applies to each, different thresholds of oppression justifying each, and in
the compatibility of each with self-determination. Yet advocates of both asymmetry and
symmetry share an assumption, which is that humanitarian intervention and rebellion
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against oppressive governments are ethically parallel. That is, both are means of securing
the same ends, and there is therefore a range of cases in which either might be chosen,
depending on which seems best suited to a case’s specifics.10 Dobos, again, writes:
Both radical rebellion and humanitarian intervention aim to defend citizens
against tyranny and human rights abuses at the hands of their government.
The only difference is that rebellion is waged by the oppressed subjects them-
selves, while humanitarian intervention is carried out by foreigners on their
behalf.11
Asymmetry and symmetry advocates differ about whether there is a set of cases in
which only one sort of action is permissible. But both presume that in other cases, the
same oppression might justify either rebellion or humanitarian intervention.
Thinking about intervention and rebellion in this way gives rise to some problems.
On that view, two different entities – a domestic rebel leadership and a foreign inter-
vener – can, in principle, have the same jus belli at the same time, at least prima facie.
Motivated by the same objective, their ultimate ends won’t conflict. But, given that
they are likely to adopt different means and perhaps different strategic objectives, there is
a possibility of military – and political – confliction. If they had parallel prima facie jus-
tifications, one way to resolve their different claims would be by appealing more gen-
eral principles of jus ad bellum rather than to a theory designed to make sense of
problems specific to interventions. So, for instance, even if each, considered indepen-
dently, could satisfy proportionality and had a reasonable prospect of success, ‘neces-
sity’ might help decide: if rebellion had the same prospect of success as intervention,
but would secure it at a higher price, then necessity would dictate favouring interven-
tion instead. Or if the ratio between expected morally relevant costs and benefits was
equal between them, one might be chosen over the other due to a better chance (or
expected degree) of success, albeit at a higher (but still morally acceptable) price in rel-
evant collateral costs. Sometimes cooperation might satisfy best the conditions of jus
ad bellum. Or, if all else is equal between alternatives, one might harmonize better with
another principle, such as autonomy or fair distribution of costs. But, whichever is
chosen, deciding by applying ad bellum criteria case-by-case implies that whether or
not a political or military relationship occurs between external and internal actors (and
what form it might take) is theoretically and normatively secondary.
I think this underestimates the question’s importance. Its significance is thrown into
sharper relief if we start from the thought that, instead of presenting parallel alterna-
tives, intervention and rebellion are likely in many cases to be complementary. Let’s
assume, first, that the core set of rights that might legitimately motivate either inter-
vention or rebellion are those contributing, as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen (1789) puts it, to a more general ‘right of resistance against oppression’. As
formulated, this is not the same as a ‘right to resist’: instead, it captures the idea that
people have a right to be protected from oppression and suggests that there may be
agents who have placed themselves under a duty so to protect them. I presume, sec-
ondly, that the first-best possibility in the current international order is that this duty
is discharged by peoples’ own governments. Governments may be regarded as being
under a perfect duty to protect (at the very least) their own citizens. They frequently
fail to do so, either by failing to resist other oppressors or by themselves actively
oppressing. In such cases, the responsibility for discharging this duty might devolve to
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or be taken up by another entity. For reasons I will discuss more fully in the third and
fourth sections, it is better, ceteris paribus, that people secure their rights in a self-deter-
mining way: it respects better the value of autonomy and is more likely to achieve
deep political change with stable outcomes. That being the case, where no viable
peaceful, constitutional route to change exists, then the second-best possibility is for
competent domestic leaders to challenge the rights-violating government through legit-
imate rebellion. It is therefore only if domestic initiative fails (or fails to materialize)
that the third best alternative is justifiable: to seek the assistance of foreign actors in
resisting oppression by means of intervention.12 On this view, cases like the Rwandan
or Darfur or Bosnian genocides fall into the third category: domestic government
failed to resist the violence or perpetrated it, and no other suitable domestic actor was
available to defeat it. Therefore, the right of resistance against oppression could argu-
ably be claimed against international actors.
On this complementarity view, then, intervention and rebellion are not parallel pos-
sibilities, arising simultaneously as rival options in a range of similar cases. Instead,
they complement each other, the less ideal alternative arising only where the more
ideal fails. Indirect military intervention arises as a means of addressing one particular
type of failure, when a domestic rebellion seeks to defeat oppression but needs outside
assistance.13 On this view, a justification for indirect military intervention occurs as a
function of (prima facie) justified domestic rebellion. It is not first and foremost a func-
tion of an international right (or duty) to intervene or an extension of a prior duty of
humanitarian intervention.
On the view I propose, then, the right to engage in intervention therefore cannot be
parallel to (nor can it be independent of) the right of rebellion because it is a condi-
tion of someone’s having a right to intervene that domestic rebellion has either failed
already or is expected to fail. Intervention’s permissibility thus turns on justifications
for rebellion in a way that’s quite different from what other scholars have supposed.
Dilemmas of Indirect Agency I: Military Engineering versus Victory
Michael Walzer’s noninterventionism rejects parallelism and the idea of symmetry in
particular. Drawing on Mill, he places a value on domestic self-determination that
defeats liberal arguments for intervening in most cases. Secessionists might request
assistance on the basis that they represented a distinct people whose self-determination
was stymied within a larger state. And ‘crimes that shock the conscience of mankind’
might trigger a duty of rescue by demonstrating that there was no natural, self-deter-
mined ‘fit’ between government and governed. Otherwise, the only residual exception
is where counterintervention prevents a wrongful intervention by another state from
distorting self-determination.14
Many liberal theorists reject Walzer’s emphasis on the value of self-determination.15
But I think he and Mill nevertheless understood something important about any inter-
vention aiming at political reform. This has less to do with self-determination as a
moral value and more to do with its importance as a de facto political dimension of
those cases in which indirect military intervention seems most promising. Properly
appraising its significance (first two subsections of Part 3) brings to light a dilemma
(Subsection 3) for the theory and practice of indirect military intervention between (a)
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embracing the rebels’ political goals and aiming strategically at military victory and (b)
keeping the rebels’ goals at arm’s length while concentrating strategically on engineer-
ing the balance of forces within the state in order to facilitate political transition.
Mill and Walzer on Nonintervention
Mill’s and Walzer’s noninterventionism addresses two ways of altering the political
institutions of another state: reform intervention simpliciter, which occurs without
prior initiation of rebellion within the target state, and indirect military intervention.
But, as Mill puts it, ‘[o]f these cases, that of a people in arms for liberty is the only
one of any nicety, or which theoretically at least, is likely to present conflicting moral
considerations’.16 Intuitively, such cases might seem to require that capable demo-
cratic states offer military assistance to the oppressed. But both Mill and Walzer resist
that conclusion. Their common ground is in emphasizing the importance of political
self-determination to defining what is permissible. Both maintain that it points towards
a general principle of nonintervention in international affairs, albeit with some impor-
tant exceptions. But their arguments differ in emphasis.
In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer characterizes self-determination as a value that
grounds a moral claim right against interference by political outsiders: ‘Self-determina-
tion [. . .] is the right of a people “to become free by their own efforts” if they can’.17
It is connected, Walzer implies, to the ‘right’ that ‘the citizens of a sovereign state have
[. . .] to suffer only at one another’s hands’ when seeking to ‘shape the domestic
arrangements or alter the conditions of life’ in their country.18 In a later restatement,
Walzer expanded on the normative status of self-determination. Judged from the per-
spective of the international community, he maintains, the legitimacy of states is ‘plu-
ralist in character’ and reflects ‘our recognition of diversity and our respect for
communal integrity and for different patterns of cultural and political development’.19
The value of self-determination ‘derives its moral and political force from the rights of
contemporary men and women to live as members of a historic community and to
express their inherited culture through political forms worked out by themselves’.20
To open up space within which to revisit the question of indirect military interven-
tion, I want to contrast Walzer’s treatment of self-determination with two others. First,
what we might call democratic self-determination is a strongly normative ideal that is
realized where all competent members of a unified political community engage in an
undistorted, egalitarian process of collective self-determination. Like Walzer’s, this
ideal is grounded in the individual’s right to autonomy, embracing both narrowly indi-
vidual pursuits and choices arising from and affecting groups that individuals might
(choose to) belong to. But, as such, self-determination really only occurs under certain
conditions. Allen Buchanan, for instance, maintains that self-determination implies
‘group agency’ which requires ‘a structure or process that coordinates the actions of
the individual members in such a way as to justify the claim that there is a collective
agent’.21 Where one part of a people systematically dictates to another without consul-
tation, then agency in this normative sense simply isn’t attributable to the group as a
whole. The category of societies that genuinely experience democratic self-determina-
tion therefore excludes authoritarian states, the very cases in relation to which the
question of indirect military intervention arises. By contrast, Walzer thinks that even
under authoritarian conditions a de facto process of self-determination might yet occur,
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yielding outcomes that are intrinsically valuable even though they fall far short of the
ideal of democratic self-determination: authoritarian self-determination ‘has value even
if it is not always pretty, and even if its outcome does not conform to philosophical
standards of political and social justice’.22
Walzer’s ideal falls somewhere between democratic self-determination and the politi-
cal idea at the heart of Mill’s relatively pragmatic and normatively parsimonious
account. In ’Nonintervention,’ Mill presents self-determination chiefly as a political
constraint that it would be morally wrong to neglect rather than as a moral right that
must be honoured or a moral value to be protected. He doesn’t use the term ‘self-de-
termination’ in the text let alone define it as a right, but he does highlight the way a
community may negotiate its political commitments endogenously rather than having
them imposed from outside. The normative significance of self-determination in this
sense arises from empirical assumptions about its importance for founding free gov-
ernment.
Mill thinks self-determination important for two reasons. First, where it is permitted
to occur, it can tell parties outside the state something about the moral and political
condition of the people inside. If a people successfully replaces domestic tyranny with
stable democracy, for instance, then outsiders know it has cultivated conditions suit-
able for ‘free government’. But if it remains subject to authoritarian rule, then out-
siders cannot be sure about its readiness for change. And they should be fairly
adamant about this: absent successful revolution, outsiders know that they don’t know.
Second, Mill thought that domestic, self-determining struggle was necessary not only
instrumentally to defeat tyrants but also as a ‘school’ through which to learn demo-
cratic virtues and values.23 Only by completing the struggle, Mill thought, do the
political community and its members undergo the deep changes necessary to support
a new constitutional order. True and lasting freedom depends on a resulting ‘balance
of forces’ that outside interference can only ‘disturb’. This idea of balance informs
Mill’s account of both the conditions for ‘the permanent maintenance of freedom’ and
the struggle through which people may ‘contend successfully’ for it.24 So, if the coun-
try lacks a balance suitable to ‘free institutions,’ then only by internal struggle between
its opposing elements can it achieve one.25
Recent empirical work on campaigns for democracy bears out Mill’s assumptions
about both the transformative effects of engaging in struggle and their importance for
successful postconflict democratic institutions. In their influential analysis of nonvio-
lent resistance, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan argue that the success of both
campaigns for democracy and their results is a function of the nature of the political
struggle itself. Crucially, a movement’s success in achieving mass participation and
support is vital to its ability to sustain the struggle and disrupt the opposing regime
and to building support for new institutions that will last beyond the conflict. This is
partly a matter of mobilizing more and more opponents of the regime and creating
‘loyalty shifts’ that undermine its power base and convert more people to democracy.
Like Mill, Chenoweth and Stephan therefore think that external interventions are
‘never substitutes’ for internal struggle.26 In a similar vein, Ali Kadivar argues that
‘the duration of unarmed mobilization during democratic transitions predicts the suc-
cess of democratic consolidation’. The longer the struggle, the stronger and more
stable is the resulting democracy.27 Studies of violent movements support similar con-
clusions. Although recent comparative research presents a bleak picture so far as the
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correlation between civil wars in general and the emergence of democracy is con-
cerned, work on insurgencies that aim specifically at that outcome is more optimistic.
Elizabeth Jean Wood, for instance, argues that, although nonviolent mass action may
be a more promising route more generally to positive political change, ‘in oligarchic
societies, sustained insurgency [. . .] may lead to democratic rule’.28 Moreover, recent
empirical work, including Wood’s, suggests that various outcomes tending to deepen,
support, and enrich democracy are correlated with involvement in struggle, including
‘more egalitarian gender roles, a more equitable distribution of property rights, an
empowered civil society, and unprecedented political participation’. Even the experi-
ence of violence itself during insurgency can sometimes have ‘pro-social’ effects that
benefit democratic prospects after civil war.29
None of these observations recommend violent insurgency over nonviolent forms of
action. All else being equal, nonviolence offers better prospects when opportunities
exist to pursue it, both for the struggle itself and for the longevity of democratic out-
comes.30 But, while armed struggle may be less auspicious, it too sometimes suc-
ceeds.31 And, of course, the choice isn’t always entirely in the hands of rebels;
violence is often the government’s initiative.32 Where violence succeeds, it is when,
alongside armed struggle, the opposition has the time and means of bringing about
political transformation – through ‘diverse, mass mobilization’ and by instigating ‘loy-
alty shifts within the ruling [regime’s] economic and military elites’ which build the
‘mass support sufficient to bring about revolutionary change’.33
Where armed rebellion breaks out during prodemocracy struggles, then, there are
reasons to favour Mill’s assumptions. Without a further modification to his theory that
I propose in the next section, both militate in favour of leaving rebels to themselves,
the second one above all. Let’s call that process whereby a people decides its own
political institutions without interference concrete self-determination. It might be
doubted that self-determination in Walzer’s (and Mill’s) normatively undemanding
sense has enough intrinsic moral value to outweigh the value of rescuing individuals
from basic rights violations. But Mill’s idea that concrete self-determination is an
important part of the problem that indirect intervention faces is independent of this
claim, and I think it should be taken seriously. What it posits is twofold: on the one
hand, concrete self-determination is an empirical constraint that limits the scope for
international action; but on the other, by the same reasoning its importance in shaping
political outcomes means that promoting it must also be a normatively important part
of the political aim of both rebellion and, if it can be justified, intervention.
I’ll set aside democratic self-determination because it elides the distinction that Mill
asks us to make. ‘Self-determination’ will henceforth refer to Mill’s concern unless
otherwise stated.
Internal Counterintervention
Mill’s emphasis on concrete self-determination is important, but his focus on how
external actors can vitiate it distracts from something else: this is the distorting effect
of high concentrations of armed capability wielded by particular domestic actors. Mill’s
account can be made to yield a plausible case for indirect military intervention if we
introduce a further premise – that coercive means are artificial factors that can balk
and distort self-determination, regardless of whether they originate domestically or
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abroad. The resulting dichotomy between ‘artificial’ and, as it were, ‘natural’ factors
isn’t meant to imply any sort of underlying natural law teleology. It indicates ways in
which military force can exert influence in shaping political change that is dispropor-
tionate to the number of people who wield it. Absent its role in multiplying their sal-
ience, what remains is a process of political struggle which is natural at least insofar as
that source of distortion has been negated.
Let’s review how this might work by distinguishing two sources of a regime’s power.
The first may be called ‘sociological’ legitimacy.34 Taken in a broad sense, this
encompasses both the rational endorsement of the government’s rule by those with
objective reasons to support it – its beneficiaries – and the acquiescence of those who
uphold it even though it doesn’t serve their interests. The latter may uphold a govern-
ment simply by not resisting or even by actively supporting it. Either might be due to
a prevalent belief in the moral legitimacy of the government, or to fear, a lack of orga-
nization, or adapted preferences. Together, these factors shape the layer of personal
qualities and values whose orientation, rootedness, and distribution are Mill’s concern
in ‘Non-Intervention.’ The second source of power is an ability to coerce citizens by
drawing on a (near) monopoly on the (best) means of violence. If the government has
the preponderance of arms (considering quantity, technological quality, and trained
personnel to use them), it may be able to shore up a shortfall in support by threaten-
ing would-be dissenters. This might also account for habits of acquiescence and
adapted preferences, if large-scale force has been used to imprint the population with
a collective memory of the dire consequences of resistance.35
Hannah Arendt’s analysis of revolution relies on an account of political power along
these lines. ‘Power’ in the true sense of the word comes from below, she argues, ide-
ally constituted by people coming together and freely coordinating their actions. In
this way, they can ‘empower’ a democratic government. But even autocrats rely on
some degree of power in this sense, albeit in an impoverished form. Theirs generally
combines the active support of a smaller subset of the population, including the armed
forces, and the passive acquiescence of most of the remainder. Ruling purely by coer-
cion is impossible since autocrats need part of the population to support them in
applying whatever force is required in order to control the rest. They enjoy greater
security when they can rely on demoralization or habit to ensure that most people just
go along with their rule.36 One way, then, that revolution can occur is when mass pro-
test demonstrates a declining willingness to obey, which threatens a catastrophic
encroachment on the regime’s power base and which might eventually force it to
choose: either capitulate or commit to the difficult labour of sustained mass coer-
cion.37 Given the nature of modern armed forces and technology, the extent to which
the state’s armed forces can intensify its coercive power – what R.B. Gregg calls
‘power over’ – will frequently be sufficient to destroy the ‘power with’ of popular
opposition: ‘In a head-on clash between violence and power,’ Arendt writes, ‘the out-
come is hardly in doubt.’38
On Arendt’s view, then, the logic of violence in an armed confrontation is at odds
with the logic of political self-determination as Mill conceives it. The greater the asym-
metry of arms between opponents, the more likely it is that coercion rather than popu-
lar power and political engagements between opponents will determine outcomes and,
hence, the more self-determination will be distorted.39 The success of popularly self-
determining political revolution relies on convincing enough people to defect to the
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opposition, withdrawing their acquiescence with the incumbent powers.40 But even if
opponents of government predominated across the state, it is no guarantee that revolu-
tion can succeed. As Stathis Kalyvas writes, ‘it is not necessarily the case that political
majorities enjoy a military advantage over minorities; in fact, the opposite may be
true’.41 So even without foreign interference, the progress and outcome of domestic
conflict (the balances emphasized by Mill) are shaped by influences acting contrary to
the logic of political self-determination. This points to a plausible objective for indirect
military interveners, similar to that of counterintervention in Mill’s and Walzer’s analy-
ses: intervention should compensate for the artificial effects of a distribution of violent
means favouring the regime.42
Let’s call the theory that this sort of domestic counterintervention is legitimately a
neo-Millian account. While Arendt commented extensively on revolution, she didn’t
offer an account of legitimate intervention. But there is another historical theory of
foreign intervention in revolutionary wars that helps fill out the neo-Millian account.
Mikhail Tukhachevsky’s article, ‘Revolution from Without’, contributed to Bolshevik
debates during the Russian Civil War about supporting popular communist revolution
abroad. It shares with Mill’s and Walzer’s analyses (and, indeed, Chenoweth and Ste-
phan’s) a belief that revolution must essentially be the work of domestic political
forces and cannot be imposed externally. What it adds is twofold: first, Tukhachevs-
ky’s recognition that government arms are likely to crush incipient but politically
promising revolts; and second, his appreciation of the role of military success in shap-
ing the war’s political outcomes.
‘In general,’ Tukhachevsky writes, ‘the conduct of socialist war must be an exten-
sion of the revolutionary work of the communists of the other State, if the sum of con-
ditions there prevents the development of revolution without assistance.’ Mirroring
Mill’s worry, he writes that, ‘[t]o impose a socialist revolution by force is impossible.
[It] can only be the handing over of armed force to a revolutionary working class
which is unable to get the better of the army and police of its own bourgeoisie’.43 But
Tukhachevsky nevertheless offers an account of legitimate foreign intervention drawing
on a Leninist theory that the state simply is a concentration of coercive power. Its
essential components are the ‘special bodies of armed men’ employed to maintain a
system of domination enabling a small minority to exploit an expanding and increas-
ingly impoverished majority. On Lenin’s account, asymmetry in the ownership of pro-
ductive means necessitates a radical asymmetry in the ownership of destructive
means.44 Consequently, if revolutionary insurrection breaks out, Tukhachevsky writes:
One side – the bourgeoisie – possesses a regular, well-trained and well-
equipped army, whose commanding officers are firmly attached to the bour-
geois class and, like it, accustomed to hate any proletarian movement whole-
heartedly. On the other side, a workers’ army just coming into existence, an
army which has to be created from nothing, having neither officers, arms nor
equipment.
Provided the state doesn’t hesitate in using violence, the asymmetry can be decisive.
Then revolution can succeed only if benevolent outside forces support the insurgents’
fight long enough for the balance to shift in their favour.45
What this adds to a neo-Millian account is a suggestion about how a contribution of
military force by an international actor can facilitate struggle without vitiating its
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integrity as a process of concrete political self-determination. First and foremost, the
purpose of intervening is to prevent overwhelming domestic military superiority from
crushing it. But doing so has a second beneficial effect. By delaying the state’s repres-
sive forces directly, intervention facilitates indirectly an emerging domestic preponder-
ance of political forces favourable to revolution that can, in turn, promote a parallel
shift in the balance of military force. Like recent work on the theory of nonviolent
mass opposition, Tukhachevsky’s focus is on the importance of shifting political alle-
giances, particularly those of soldiers.46 Whereas counterrevolutionary officers are
dependable, the poorer, ordinary soldiers are prone to defect. So if Soviet intervention
deflects the initial bourgeois repression, the ensuing flow of defectors eventually tilts
the balance of violence over to the revolution, aligning it with the distribution of politi-
cal will across the country while further expanding the revolutionary political base. So
if the bourgeoisie fails to prevent civil war from unfolding, ‘little by little all the advan-
tages will swing over decisively to the side of the revolution’.47
A Theory of Indirect Warfare
Whether expressed in liberal or Marxist terms, the upshot of a neo-Millian theory is
the same: it opens up the possibility of a form of war that is indirect in the sense that
it contributes to another ongoing war, one initiated and led by agents other than the
interveners. What it therefore needs is an account of how the additional violence inter-
veners introduce ought to be integrated with that of the domestic rebels. In this con-
nection, interveners face a twofold dilemma: concerning how they contribute to the
rebels’ political ends and how they frame their strategic-military objectives in doing so.
Indirect military interveners must choose or find an appropriate compromise
between two ways of orientating their actions vis-a-vis the rebels’ political ends. On
the one hand, they might embrace them, fighting for those ends as their own: violence,
then, is justified insofar as those goals are just, the means are proportionate and neces-
sary, and it can help secure them. The strategic aim should then be victory for the
rebels. There are two arguments for adopting this direct approach to the rebellion.
First, if the ultimate aim of indirect military intervention is to support democratiza-
tion, then choices tending towards success are preferable, ceteris paribus. Second, swift
victory might reduce the overall human cost of civil war (especially in light of Allen
Buchanan’s analysis, discussed below (Part 4).48 If so, then indirect military interven-
tion should not only help rebels win but also seek to ensure that the number of casu-
alties averted by shortening war exceeds any caused by the additional force needed to
expedite victory.49
But on the other hand, a neo-Millian might limit interveners’ political goals to facili-
tating concrete self-determination, which suggests that an arm’s-length relationship
with rebel goals would be more appropriate. The goal of indirect military intervention
is then distinguishable from the freedoms that revolutionaries pursue, even if helps
secure them indirectly. While aiming to negate factors that vitiate political self-deter-
mination, indirect military intervention must avoid adding further vitiating factors. This
restricts the inputs of force it adds, limiting them to those necessary to counteract the
effects of asymmetry in the distribution of force, and counsels against further inputs
that might enhance the chance of rebel victory or accelerate it. Rather than expediting
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rebel victory, indirect military intervention might therefore have to allow the civil war
to continue for its full natural – or quasi-natural – duration.
Tukhachevsky’s analysis of defection supports the view that expediting victory could
have disastrous political implications. Underlying the defections on which he focuses
and the changing military balance they cause is a more fundamental shift, leading back
towards Mill’s concerns. As Gregg argued in his pacifist critique of Leninism, genuine
revolutionary change occurs when enemies are persuaded to change perspective and
rethink their values. The direct application of violence is likely to have limited value in
achieving this – coercion typically only creates the appearance of conversion and
results in superficial political change.50 Contemporary analysts of democratic revolu-
tion agree that the encouragement of military defections is important to the success of
campaigns for change.51 They also recognize that the attachment of the military to the
state and a failure to convert it to democratic values and to civilian control constitute
major obstacles to the fulfilment of revolutionary hopes after the overt struggle ends.52
Military defections contribute a vital part to the sort of moral and political dynamic
that Gregg indicates whereby enemy soldiers are converted to revolutionary values.
Prioritizing swift victory at the cost of reducing the number of converts risks jeopar-
dizing political transformations that can contribute to the legitimacy of a postrevolu-
tionary order. Given the terrible destructiveness of civil wars, however, a sensible
theory ought to give due attention to all three ends to which intervention might con-
tribute: first, limiting military destruction; second, helping revolutionaries secure their
goals; and third, facilitating political transition through Mill’s ‘school’ of struggle (un-
derstood, following Tukhachevsky and Gregg, as a process of defection and conver-
sion) by rebalancing domestic military forces. Where these ends conflict, deciding
which way to turn demands of interveners a difficult judgement about both military
and political matters. The right decision as to which ends to prioritize, resolving the
dilemma, is unlikely to be obvious.
Dilemmas of Indirect Agency II: Self-determination versus Armed Entelechy
Let ‘subject’ refer to the political entity directing violence as opposed to the agents of
violence whom it directs. The first set of dilemmas concerned the ends and means of
legitimate violence; the second concerns its subjects. In cases of humanitarian inter-
vention simpliciter, there is only one subject, the intervener. Likewise, in a purely
domestic revolution, those who successfully claim the leadership of rebellion form a
subject of legitimate violence. But indirect military intervention envisages two subjects,
the intervener and the rebel leadership. And since they are not responding in parallel
to the rights claims of the oppressed, we need an account of what their relationship
should be.53 This question poses another dilemma. Insofar as indirect military inter-
vention aims to prevent artificial factors from distorting a natural process of self-deter-
mination, its actions should passively track rebel needs where doing so is compatible
with supporting an appropriate rebalancing of forces. However, it is likely that, in
some cases, indirect military interveners will have to make choices between rival rebel
leaderships. When they do, interveners play an unavoidably creative role in shaping the
political complexion of the rebel side as a whole.
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Legitimacy in Rebellion
Let’s start with a simpler case: a people fights for liberty without outside assistance
but with reasonable hope of success. What requirements must rebel leaders satisfy to
claim moral and political legitimacy? The assumption that something corresponding to
what the just war tradition calls ‘legitimate’ or ‘right’ authority is truly required by the
jus ad bellum has been questioned by some recent work, but it also has its defenders.54
Based on some of these arguments, I shall assume that legitimacy is at least partly sca-
lar and depends on six factors:
(1) Strategic intelligence: This epistemic requirement refers to the ability to identify
military goals suited to achieving the rebellion’s political aims and to formulate a
credible military strategy for securing them by calculating the effects of alternatives
and comparing them.55
(2) Coercive ability / authority to command: Leadership must be able to coordi-
nate enough people reliably enough to execute its strategy. This might ideally be
due to people’s belief in its competence and good faith. But it might also rely on
coercion, especially during the incipient phases of a civil war.56
(3) Moral probity: Relatedly, legitimacy is affected by a commitment (and ability,
per [2]) to satisfy the requirements of just conduct in war as far as possible,
whether defined directly by the legal jus in bello or in other ways.57
(4) Consent: Legitimacy is strengthened by a willingness of the people on whose
behalf it acts to be led by it into and during war. In part, this may be the other
side of the same coin as (2) in a subset of the cases where leadership relies on
authority rather than mere coercion. It is partly about consenting to being led by
this particular subject and partly about consenting to its particular decisions to ini-
tiate war and to fight it in a particular way.58
(5) Input legitimacy: Leaders gain legitimacy according to their epistemic capacity
to gauge the character and preferences of those it leads. It benefits from knowl-
edge of the degree to which people (and how many people) are willing to risk
death, injury, bereavement, and impoverishment for the sake of political goals.
This is an important indication of the value that ought to be put on their lives
(which, I presume, they may be able to discount) and what value to put on their
political aspirations when applying proportionality and necessity standards to dif-
ferent strategies.59
(6) Orientation: The rebel leadership needs to have sincerely embraced the appropri-
ate political objectives and moral ends.
I take it that all of these conditions are directly relevant to the credibility of a rebel
group’s claim to legitimacy as the leadership of a people in revolt against their govern-
ment. All indicate qualities that it must have or facets of its relationship to those peo-
ple that affect its claim to be competent to act in their name and their interests.
Where a rebel group satisfied all of these conditions, it would have the strongest possi-
ble claim to recognition as legitimate leadership. But each may be satisfied partially
rather than wholly. Establishing a minimum threshold of legitimacy above which an
agent can claim the right to use force on behalf of others is, of course, a vexed ques-
tion, but this is more than I require for present purposes.60 Suffice to say that any
faults under any of the six headings will weaken a group’s claim, a fact likely to be
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particularly important where there are competing claims for legitimate authority
between rival groups of leaders.
If these are plausible criteria for cases where there is not (yet) a case for indirect
military intervention, then it points towards two types of scenario in which interven-
tion might begin to appear necessary. In the best case, rebel leaders satisfy these crite-
ria well enough to claim a high degree of legitimacy but lack something else. In the
more difficult case, leaders fail to satisfy these criteria more comprehensively.
Learning from al Qaeda
So, what does this suggest about the relationship between the interveners and rebels?
Where rebel leaders enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, then interveners should work
through their leadership. The reasons for connecting with the rebel leadership in the
first case are twofold. First, if leaders satisfy conditions (4) to (6) in particular, then
both the leadership and the people it represents have an autonomy-based moral claim
to political recognition. Second, the rebel leadership is itself a central part of the politi-
cal objective of an indirect military intervention. If an intervener fails to establish a
suitable relationship with a legitimate, competent, domestic subject, then its actions
will constitute a simple reform intervention with all the problems that come with
that.61
To illustrate, imagine two states fighting a defensive war against a third. Whether
they maintain an effective alliance may affect their ability to win and satisfy propor-
tionality and necessity. But if they do so without an alliance, then their relationship
doesn’t matter: victory is still victory. Not so with indirect military intervention: if you
don’t have an appropriate domestic partner among the rebels, and if your strategy for
intervention doesn’t take its development into account, then this vitiates the outcomes
even if you win the war.62 This is because the aims of indirect intervention are of a
specific political kind: to secure democracy, it is necessary to help establish institu-
tions, the people needed to operate them, and an appropriate political relationship
between those people and the wider population. Indirect interveners must therefore
try to bring about a constellation of forces through which the violence they introduce
can help create and give shape to political institutions. Without an appropriate rela-
tionship with the right rebel leaders, indirect military intervention is therefore unlikely
to succeed. By contrast, the two states fighting an aggressor succeed when they put a
barrier between political institutions, which already exist and which they wish to pre-
serve, and the effects of violence.
The lines of argument considered so far indicate that indirect interveners ought to
adopt a more or less passive attitude, politically, towards the rebel leaderships. If polit-
ical initiative, as Mill argues, should be entirely endogenous, then external assistance
should track domestic initiatives. Interveners might conceivably provide leadership in
purely military, strategic matters, but, as far as unfolding political balances are con-
cerned, the rebel leaders lead, the indirect military intervener follows. This does not,
however, exhaust the problem. Other factors point in the opposite direction.
In the ‘best case’, there already exists a domestically legitimate leadership for inter-
veners to engage with. But this doesn’t always occur. Allen Buchanan identifies two
common problems. First, revolutions frequently exhibit multiple, rival leaderships.
Each might satisfy some criteria to some degree, but not all. Second is when the
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challenges facing incipient revolt compel leaders to violate individual rights and the
principles of jus in bello. For instance, leaders needing to build support for rebellion
against a regime that puts a high price on disobedience may feel compelled to terrorize
their own people more than the enemy does. And the need to establish unified leader-
ship might also motivate violence between rival groups. Both problems lead Buchanan
to recommend earlier interventions, all else being equal, lending further weight to the
reasoning for aiming at swift victory discussed in Part 3. They also support leniency in
applying criterion (3) when evaluating the eligibility of rebel leaders for external sup-
port.63
But the second problem Buchanan highlights adds a further complication: how to
decide between rival rebel leaderships. This problem arose in Syria when the Free Syr-
ian Army fought alongside a swathe of factions, larger and smaller. One response
might be to let the rebels fight amongst themselves and to back the horse that proves
itself by winning. But doing so faces a similar objection to nonintervention. The fastest
horse might be the best funded and armed, not the most morally promising. Allowing
internecine fighting to run its course permits artificial factors to influence outcomes.
And the most successful groups might not be the most legitimate or those most likely
to pursue democracy and human rights: a group that satisfied conditions (1) and (2)
but not (3), (4), (5), or (6) might attract more recruits in a desperate struggle than
groups with the opposite bundle. Over the course of the Syrian conflict, for instance,
more secular, nationalist rebels found themselves outgunned by the regime. By con-
trast, al Qaeda’s soldiers – many with long experience of insurgency elsewhere – had
greater funds and better weapons. By forging an umbrella movement like the Jabhat
al-Nusra Front, al Qaeda was able to use military proficiency to encourage large num-
bers to compromise on ideology and defect from less radical groups.64
Al Qaeda’s strategy capitalized on a phenomenon identified by the comparative soci-
ology of civil war. As Kalyvas writes, ‘military resources generally trump the popula-
tion’s prewar political and social preferences in spawning control. In turn, control has
a decisive impact on the population’s collaboration with a political actor’.65 Al Qaeda
wasn’t representative of wider Syrian opinion at first but leveraged its fighting capacity
to increase the proportion of people willing to espouse its goals. This is a form of lead-
ership that looks beyond the passivity of tracking de facto public opinion, instead seek-
ing to reshape it through conversion – in this regard, it recalls Tukhachevsky.
Highlighting the dangers of a wait-and-see approach, it suggests that, rather than wait-
ing for the race to finish, indirect interveners ought to cultivate militarily the morally
most promising rebels, judged according to the degree to which they satisfy the six cri-
teria of internal legitimacy and especially (3)–(6). This way, conversions might be
made to flow back from groups like al Qaeda and towards more benign elements.
Deliberately cultivating internal political possibilities creates a tension between this
method of intervention and Millian principles. Like Leninism, it recognizes the duty
of revolutionary leadership – both domestic and foreign – ‘to be that of guiding and
developing popular consciousness, not passively reflecting it’.66 But it is also driven by
a neo-Millian ambition to counterbalance the artificial effects of military capacities
while ensuring that leaders endogenous to the state are wedded to external normative
standards of democracy. If indirect military intervention is likely to have to give a steer
to political change in this way, this further complicates how much force indirect mili-
tary intervention should contribute: in addition to that required by balancing conflict
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between opponents, it is also necessary to correct the balance within the rebel side. And
trying to attract and convert rebels on the ground will tend towards increasing the
armed contributions beyond that required by the first balance.
Conclusions: Calculating Proportionate Costs
With its demand for careful attention to the landscape of political allegiances and ‘ex-
isting social forces,’ as Yves Winter puts it, indirect military intervention takes us into
Machiavellian theoretical territory.67 It doesn’t act purely on abstract humanitarian
ideals, opposing force with force in order to preserve existing lives, but it rather seeks
concrete political possibilities to cultivate, promoting the most promising at the
expense of the others. Through this sort of armed entelechy, political relationships
between interveners and rebels become central and essential parts of normative analysis,
not contingent, peripheral issues.
I conclude with a third issue, one distancing indirect military intervention from
humanitarian intervention understood as a purely defensive measure. Parts 3 and 4
identified a series of difficulties determining how much force indirect military interven-
tion should introduce. The third part identified a difficult choice between victory-di-
rected violence and balance-directed engineering. The fourth part showed how the
need to bolster one group at the expense of rivals might complicate matters further.
But the problem is even more intractable. This is because of the diverse functions that
violence performs on the neo-Millian account: insofar as the aim is re-engineering an
inauspicious military imbalance, it doesn’t only preserve lives from violence but also
protects the integrity of a political balance from distortion. If it also contributes to
armed entelechy, then violence isn’t narrowly defensive (orientated towards preserving
things that exist) but creative of new possibilities (by growing them from indigenous
seeds). The institutions that this contributes to might, in due course, defend people
from threats – violence introduced now could therefore be interpreted as indirectly
defensive of people in the future. But its function is not literally and directly defensive:
it aims at a future in which something valuable exists where nothing as valuable
existed before.68 And the value of the new entity is much less determinate than that of
the lives of a finite number of existing people.
Insofar as a democratic government created with help from indirect military inter-
vention offers ongoing protections and opportunities to future generations, its value is
of indefinite extent. It is therefore less clear how we should calibrate judgements about
the proportionality of actions that will collaterally harm innocent people. If you are
defending a finite number of existing (innocent) people from imminent harms, as you
might be in a direct, humanitarian intervention, then it is excessive to cause similar
harms to a greater number of innocent people. But it is less clear how to specify that
point beyond which harms to the innocent cease to be the lesser evil when they are
the by-product of violence aimed at creating things whose value is not directly com-
mensurable with innocent lives. In place of, in principle, the quite determinate appli-
cability of proportionality to humanitarian intervention, therefore, indirect military
intervention seems to demand practical moral and political judgements without the
bannisters of determinate numerical figures.
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